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When policymakers in the White house and Congress wrote the 
no Child left Behind act in 2001, they undoubtedly had places like 
Birmingham, alabama, in mind. nearly half a century after the bombings 
and protests that helped launch the civil rights movement, Birmingham 
City schools was a textbook case of urban education in decline. The 
district was hemorrhaging students and funding, forcing painful layoffs 
and the closure of often-crumbling schools. Test scores were among the 
lowest in the state, particularly for poor black children.
Sadly, not much has changed in the last six years. Less 
than 40 percent of Birmingham students graduate from 
high school on time, according to Education Week.1 
Test scores still lag the rest of the state; there are still 
large achievement gaps between black and white 
children; and the student body and budget continue to 
shrink every year. For the students who remain, most of 
whom are black and poor, “the promised land of racial 
justice” described by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. from the 
Birmingham jail must seem very far away.  
But you wouldn’t know it by asking the Alabama 
Department of Education. It says everything is fine, 
that Birmingham City Schools made “adequate yearly 
progress” last year under the federal No Child Left Behind 
Act (NCLB). And only five of the district’s 65 schools are 
“in need of improvement.” The serious consequences and 
strong interventions that NCLB’s authors envisioned for 
chronically underperforming districts like Birmingham are 
nowhere to be found. 
The reason is simple: While NCLB was designed to raise 
achievement standards every year until 2014, when 100 
percent of students are required to be “proficient,” the 
Alabama Department of Education has lowered standards 
annually, to the point where even abjectly failing districts 
like Birmingham make the grade. And it’s not alone—
every one of the accountability-avoidance gambits used in 
Alabama has been adopted in many other states. Indeed, 
the most noteworthy thing about Alabama’s elaborate 
plan to avoid NCLB accountability, and the impact of 
those actions on Birmingham, is how mundane they really 
are. Similar stories could be written about states and 
districts across the nation.
Collectively, these states and districts provide a case 
study in how determined states can undermine even 
tightly constructed laws like NCLB. And, as importantly, 
they provide a cautionary tale for members of Congress 
working to write the next version of the nation’s most 
important education law.
The Pangloss Index
A 2006 Education Sector report, Hot Air: How States 
Inflate Their Educational Progress Under NCLB, included 
a new way of measuring state compliance with NCLB 
based on data from reports submitted by the states 
to the federal government.2 The report included a 
composite index of state rankings, based on measures 
such as student test scores in elementary, middle, 
and high schools, the percent of schools and districts 
making “adequate yearly progress” or “AYP,” high 
school graduation and dropout rates, school violence 
ratings, and teacher qualifications.3 The top-ranked 
states reported the best results—the fewest high school 
dropouts, the most highly qualified teachers, the fewest 
schools to miss AYP, etc. 
Ideally, this index would have shown which states were 
doing the best job educating their students. And some of 
the numbers made sense—the lowest ranked state, the 
District of Columbia, has long been recognized as one 
of the worst-managed school systems in the country.4 
Affluent Connecticut, which routinely ranks high on the 
federal National Assessment of Educational Progress 
(NAEP), was near the top of the list. 
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But, on the whole, the index was less indicative of 
which states were actually doing well than which states 
had simply chosen to define themselves as doing well. 
Mediocre states made themselves out to be great, and low-
performing states snuck into the Top 10, while a number 
of objectively higher-performing states ranked near the 
bottom. States with big cities wracked by gang violence 
reported no dangerous schools; states with serious dropout 
problems alleged that nearly all students were graduating 
from high school; states with the nation’s lowest test scores 
reported the highest. Thus, the list was dubbed “The 
Pangloss Index,” after the character in Voltaire’s Candide 
who insisted—in the face of all evidence to the contrary—
that we live in the best of all possible worlds.
This report includes an updated Pangloss Index, based on 
a new round of state reports submitted in 2007. As Table 
1 shows, many states look about the same—Wisconsin 
and Iowa are tied for first, distinguishing themselves by 
insisting that their states house a pair of educational 
utopias along the upper Mississippi River. In contrast, 
Massachusetts—which is the highest-performing state 
in the country according to the NAEP—continues to hold 
itself to far tougher standards than most, showing up at 
46th, near the bottom of the list.
A few states, however, changed their Pangloss Index 
ranking substantially from 2006 to 2007, and none 
increased its position more than Alabama. It jumped from 
Table 1. the Pangloss index
State 2007 2006 Change State 2007 2006 Change
Iowa 1 2 1 New Hampshire 27 23 -4
Wisconsin 1 1 0 Maine 27 21 -6
Nebraska 3 4 1 Utah 29 33 4
Kansas 4 6 2 Washington 30 33 3
Alabama 5 22 17 Delaware 31 24 -7
Connecticut 6 3 -3 North Carolina 32 31 -1
Virginia 7 12 5 Wyoming 33 42 9
Tennessee 8 11 3 Louisiana 34 38 4
North Dakota 9 10 1 Arkansas 35 32 -3
South Dakota 10 5 -5 Arizona 36 35 -1
Indiana 11 8 -3 Rhode Island 37 27 -10
West Virginia 12 7 -5 Nevada 38 47 9
New Jersey 13 17 4 California 39 44 5
Montana 14 16 2 Maryland 40 49 9
Idaho 15 9 -6 Alaska 41 43 2
Vermont 16 13 -3 South Carolina 42 46 4
Michigan 17 29 12 Oregon 43 41 -2
Texas 18 19 1 New York 44 37 -7
Oklahoma 19 13 -6 Missouri 45 40 -5
Illinois 20 26 6 Massachusetts 46 39 -7
Georgia 21 29 8 Kentucky 47 36 -11
Minnesota 22 18 -4 Florida 48 45 -3
Colorado 23 19 -4 New Mexico 49 48 -1
Mississippi 24 13 -11 Hawaii 50 51 1
Ohio 25 24 -1 District of Columbia 51 50 -1
Pennsylvania 26 28 2
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22nd to 5th, and a close analysis of the data shows why: 
a huge increase in the number of schools and districts 
making AYP. In one year, the percent of schools making 
the grade increased from half to almost 90 percent, 
while the number of districts went from two-thirds to 100 
percent.
This didn’t happen because Alabama students learned 
much more in 2006 than they did in 2005.5 It happened 
because the state of Alabama, with the full approval of the 
U.S. Department of Education, manipulated the statistical 
underpinnings of NCLB in such a way that no other result 
was possible. Alabama was not exceptional in this regard; 
many other states did exactly the same thing. Alabama’s 
actions—and the impact those actions have had on the 
lives of Birmingham schoolchildren—are just one example 
of a broad national trend.
To understand how a law that has been widely denounced 
as unduly harsh was transformed into a law that is often 
comically lenient, it’s necessary to start with the early days 
of NCLB.
School Year 2001–02
Taking Care of Old Business
President Bush signed NCLB into law on January 8, 
2002. The basic principles are straightforward: Each state 
creates common academic standards for all students in 
reading and math and then tests students once a year 
to see if the standards are being achieved. Schools and 
districts that fall short are publicly identified and required 
to implement a series of reforms that get tougher the 
longer underperformance persists. The achievement bar 
gets higher every year, until 2014, when 100 percent of 
students are required to be “proficient.” 
But mindful of the strong historical role states have 
played in education, Congress gave states a great deal 
of latitude in implementing the law. States decide what 
students need to know, how to test that knowledge, 
and what score on the test counts as “proficient.” 
These and myriad other decisions created a major 
administrative challenge for state departments of 
education, particularly in states like Alabama, which still 
hadn’t gotten around to fully implementing the previous 
version of NCLB.
That law, the Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA), was 
enacted under President Clinton in 1994. It was, in many 
ways, a more radical departure from previous federal 
education policy than NCLB, requiring states to develop 
standards, adopt tests, and hold schools accountable for 
the results. But IASA lacked strong penalties for non-
compliance and was weakly enforced by the Clinton 
administration. While some states created effective 
accountability systems, others—like Alabama—treated 
the law not like a mandate but a suggestion, one they 
declined to take.
When the much-tougher NCLB was enacted, Alabama 
had to scramble to shore up its standards and move 
from “norm-referenced” tests (which measure student 
performance relative to other students) to “criterion-
referenced” tests (which measure performance relative to 
fixed standards). Recognizing the logistical challenges this 
involved, the U.S. Department of Education gave Alabama 
permission to use its old, IASA-era accountability system 
for the upcoming 2002–03 school year.  
By that measure, Birmingham City Schools was a 
mess. For 2001–02, the state gave the district a grade 
of “D-minus” in elementary school writing, a “D” on the 
ACT college entrance test, and a “D” on the high school 
graduation exam. Poor and minority students lagged 
behind their peers on state tests, while district scores on 
the norm-referenced Stanford Achievement Test were 
consistently in the lower percentiles. Two hundred twenty-
one students were suspended or expelled for weapons-
related incidents in a single year.6 Even as Birmingham 
racked up $18.5 million worth of undocumented debts, 
the district was paying its executives a total of $2.8 million 
per year, more than Mobile, Montgomery, and Huntsville 
(which together educate three times as many students) 
combined.7 Despite spending more money per pupil than 
any of Alabama’s other large school systems, Birmingham 
recorded the lowest test scores.8 
At the time, it would have been natural to assume that 
the new, tougher NCLB would ratchet up pressure on 
Birmingham to turn around these sorry results.  Instead, 
a series of actions by the state that were endorsed 
by the U.S. Department of Education had exactly 
the opposite effect, masking the city’s deep-seated 
academic problems and reducing the impetus for local 
education leaders to improve education on behalf of 
Birmingham students. 
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School Year 2002–03 
Laying the Foundation
States had a number of important decisions to make in 
2002 as they established their NCLB accountability plans. 
In addition to refining their standards and tests, they had 
to decide what trajectory of improvement they would 
require their schools to follow. NCLB seemed clear on 
this point, requiring states to set escalating performance 
targets, or “annual measurable objectives,” in “equal 
increments” from 2002 to 2014.9 The most obvious way 
to do this was to start with the current level of school 
performance, subtract that from the 100 percent target 
and then divide that figure into equal increments for each 
year. (See Figure 1.)  
This method spreads out the needed improvement over 
time, and it was adopted by a number of states. But the 
U.S. Department of Education decided that “equal” didn’t 
necessarily mean “the same,” allowing states to require 
different amounts of improvement in different years. 
Alabama, along with a number of other states, quickly 
settled on a trajectory that required schools to make only 
one-third of their improvement in the first eight years of 
NCLB. Then—much like the adjustable rate mortgages 
currently contributing to a wave of foreclosures and 
bankruptcies nationwide—schools would suddenly have 
to accomplish two-thirds of their improvement in the final 
four years. (See Figure 2.)
This “adjustable rate” trajectory seems reckless at first 
glance, a plan that would lull schools into a false sense of 
progress only to hit them with hugely difficult performance 
targets in later years. But states like Alabama knew that 
history was on their side. If tradition held, Congress would 
re-write NCLB six or seven years after its original passage. 
Unlike luckless homeowners, states would have a chance 
to renegotiate for better terms before the eight-year 
adjustable rate bill came due. And that’s precisely what 
occurred. Congress began work on NCLB reauthorization 
in 2007, with many education officials publicly calling for 
an extension of the 2014 deadline.
The second major implementation decision dealt with the 
way states held schools accountable for the performance 
of disadvantaged students. NCLB was deliberately written 
to focus resources and attention on closing the historically 
large “achievement gap” separating low-income and 
minority students from their more-affluent and white 
peers. Accordingly, the law held that schools would only 
be deemed as having made AYP if both the student body 
as a whole and every group of disadvantaged students, 
including minority and low-income students, students with 
disabilities, and students with limited English proficiency, 
met the same performance target. The idea was to help 
the “subgroups” of students who traditionally have been 
left behind. 
Many schools only have a few students in some 
subgroups. States argued—with some justification—that 
test results from very small subgroups should not be 
used to judge an entire school. The U.S. Department of 
Education agreed, noting that NCLB required the use of 
“statistically valid and reliable” measures. The department 
allowed states to establish a “minimum subgroup size” 
below which scores would not be counted.
Alabama jumped at the opportunity, establishing a 
minimum size of 40. (Most states chose a smaller 
number.10) In a relatively homogenous state like Alabama 
(over 95 percent of students are black or white) where 
many schools and districts are small, this effectively 
eliminated smaller groups from being counted as a 
Figure 1. standard improvement trajectory
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subgroup under NCLB. Over 80 percent of Alabama 
schools educate Hispanic students, for example, but only 
8.7 percent enroll 40 or more.11 
Alabama also included in its initial NCLB accountability 
plan a third element: “uniform averaging.” NCLB gives 
states the option to “average data from the [current school 
year] with data from one or two school years immediately 
preceding that school year,” in order to smooth out 
random year-to-year variations and better gauge long-
term trends.12 Alabama adopted this approach—with a 
twist. Schools would be rated by either their current year 
score or the three-year average, whichever was greater. 
This created a double standard: If a school experienced 
a one-year drop in performance, it would be buoyed by 
previous higher results. If, on the other hand, the same 
school had a one-year increase, that result would stand 
alone. 
Alabama’s use of the “uniform averaging” provision 
illustrates several critical points about state 
implementation of NCLB. From the beginning, states 
were aggressively looking for novel interpretations of 
the statute’s more obscure provisions, stretching and, 
at times, breaking the clear meaning of the law. Those 
interpretations always made it easier, not harder, for 
schools to make AYP. And the U.S. Department of 
Education was a willing partner in this process. In a July 
1, 2003 letter approving Alabama’s initial accountability 
plan (which included the adjustable rate trajectory, the 
large minimum subgroup size, and the lenient uniform 
averaging procedure), Assistant Secretary of Education 
Gene Hickok said, “I join Secretary [of Education Rod] 
Paige in congratulating you on Alabama’s commitment 
to holding schools accountable for the achievement of all 
students.”
Had that commitment been real, it would have been 
welcome in Birmingham. The district’s 2002–03 report 
card—the last under the old IASA accountability system—
was once again full of bad news. Enrollment was down 
1,100 students from the previous year. Accountability 
letter grades of “C” and “D” abounded. Scores on the 
Stanford Achievement Test averaged less than the 40th 
percentile, causing the state to designate Birmingham as 
a “watch with priority” district.13 
One local observer, a former teacher and school 
administrator, said at the time: “The sobering reality 
is that an entire generation of children has been 
abandoned. They have been left behind in academic 
failure, in violence, and in a cycle of moral and civil 
irresponsibility.”14 In 2003, the continual loss of enrollment 
and funding created a new $14 million deficit, forcing the 
district to lay off 555 employees and shutter nine schools. 
In the years afterward, the abandoned buildings and 
rusting playgrounds would serve as a constant reminder 
to the community of how far the school district had 
fallen.15
School Year 2003–04
Double Standards and Statistics
Fall 2003 began the first full year of NCLB implementation 
in Alabama. The accountability plan was established and 
the new criterion-referenced tests were in place. Given the 
previous dismal results, Birmingham had few reasons for 
optimism. 
Yet, when the results of the new test were released the 
following summer, they didn’t look so bad: 63 percent of 
fourth-graders were proficient in reading, 64 percent in 
math. High school scores were even better: 79 percent 
proficient in reading, 61 percent in math. And that was 
low compared to other districts: Statewide, 76 percent of 
fourth-graders and 86 percent of 11th-graders passed the 
reading test. 
Had Birmingham defied the odds and turned its struggling 
schools around? Unfortunately, it had not. Alabama had 
simply adopted an unusually easy test. A comparison of 
Alabama’s state test results to results from the federal 
NAEP test makes this clear. Only 23 percent of Alabama 
fourth-graders were “proficient” on the 2003 NAEP test of 
reading. While the NAEP proficiency standard is generally 
recognized as being quite rigorous, only 52 percent of 
Alabama fourth-graders met the lower, “basic” standard 
in the same year. (See Table 2.) Alabama was counting as 
“proficient” a large number of students who couldn’t even 
meet the lowest federal achievement standard.
In Birmingham, other non-state-created tests suggested 
that student performance was in decline. Even as 95 
percent of Birmingham 12th-graders passed the state’s 
high school graduation exam in reading, language, 
math, science, and social studies, the district’s average 
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score on the ACT dropped from 18.1 in 2003 to 17.4 in 
2004 (roughly equivalent to a combined score of 850 
on the “old” SAT, which is significantly less than the 
national average of about 1020. Eighty percent of all 
students score about 850). In a vestige of the old IASA 
accountability system, this earned a grade of “D-minus.”
In a state where one in four adults are functionally 
illiterate, where poverty is high, per-capita income low, 
and average educational attainment near the bottom 
nationwide, Alabama education officials were essentially 
saying “All is well! Out of the gate, we’re three-quarters of 
the way toward 100 percent proficiency.” 16
These lax standards would not, however, have been 
enough to keep Birmingham off of the NCLB list of 
low-performing districts. The law’s authors realized 
that test difficulty would vary dramatically from state to 
state. (Nearby South Carolina, for example, reported 
that only 33 percent of fourth-graders were proficient 
in reading in 2003, even though it had higher NAEP 
scores than Alabama.17) So they decreed that the first 
year’s performance target in each state would be based 
on the actual score of the school that ranked in the 
20th percentile in the previous year (in other words, the 
school that was outperformed by exactly 80 percent of 
all other schools statewide).18 That meant that states 
like Alabama, with relatively high pass rates, would have 
correspondingly higher performance targets to meet, 
putting states on a level playing field in terms of the 
relative difficulty of their initial performance targets.
The 20th percentile rule meant that roughly 80 percent of 
schools would start above the bar in terms of their overall 
scores.19 But these schools also had to meet the same 
standards for their disadvantaged—and thus frequently 
underperforming—students. If the system had worked 
as planned, the subgroup accountability provision would 
mean that many schools and districts would be identified 
as failing to meet NCLB goals. 
Understanding this, the Alabama Department of 
Education was already hard at work on creating new 
ways to let more schools and districts off the hook. 
Near the beginning of NCLB, there’s a short provision 
which says that “If significant changes are made to a 
State’s [accountability] plan, such as adoption of new 
State academic content standards and State student 
achievement standards, new academic assessments, or 
a new definition of adequate yearly progress (emphasis 
added), such information shall be submitted to the 
Secretary [of Education].”20 The U.S. Department of 
Education rightly decided that such changes would also 
have to be approved by the secretary. 
But, crucially, Congress had imposed no limit on how 
often states could request changes or how many changes 
they could make. This turned out to be a serious mistake. 
Instead of waiting to see how their accountability systems 
actually worked and adjusting accordingly, many states 
started to pepper the U.S. Department of Education with 
proposed amendments to the definition of AYP almost the 
minute their original plans were approved.21 Alabama was 
no exception. 
Alabama’s first request was one of the most significant: It 
asked to use “confidence intervals” in measuring school 
performance. Confidence intervals are a “plus or minus” 
band around a statistical result, like when a public opinion 
poll is said to be accurate to within plus or minus a few 
percentage points. It was unorthodox to apply confidence 
intervals to NCLB results. Confidence intervals are used 
in polling because polls are based on a sample, or smaller 
representative group, of the larger population. There’s 
always a chance that when pollsters call several hundred 
adults at random, an unusually large number will favor one 
candidate or another. The confidence interval represents 
this uncertainty inherent to sampling. It’s standard 
practice in polling to use a “95-percent” confidence 
interval, which means there’s a 95 percent chance that the 
actual opinion of the entire population is within the plus-
or-minus band around the result.
NCLB doesn’t use samples. It tests the entire student 
population in every school. (In fact, schools automatically 
miss AYP if fewer than 95 percent of students take the 
test.) There are no issues of sampling error to account 
for. Nonetheless, states like Alabama made the strange 
argument that a given school’s test results were indeed a 
sample, a subset of all the students who possibly could 
Table 2. 200–200 Alabama state test results vs. 
the national Assessment of educational Progress
Percent 
Proficient 
(NAEP)
Percent 
Basic 
(NAEP)
Percent 
Proficient 
(State)
4th Grade Reading 23% 52% 76%
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have attended the school that year, or (alternatively, 
depending on who you ask) all the students who have 
attended or will ever attend the school, from the day 
it opened until the end of time. Alabama also used 
a 99-percent confidence interval, not 95-percent. To be 
99 percent sure that a school’s test results represent the 
mythical larger population, the plus-or-minus band has to 
be unusually large.
Predictably, the state applied the confidence interval in 
a way that was biased toward reducing the number of 
schools missing AYP: If a school’s score fell below the 
performance target but within the confidence interval, it 
passed. A state that wanted to be really sure—say, 99 
percent sure—that schools were truly making progress 
could just as easily apply the confidence interval in the 
opposite direction, disqualifying not only all schools below 
the performance target but also those just above the 
target, but within the confidence interval, on the grounds 
that their scores were too close to the cutoff for comfort. 
But no state would ever do this; state amendments to 
NCLB accountability plans are always designed to make it 
easier for schools to demonstrate success, not harder.
Many testing experts were appalled by the confidence 
interval idea. Stanford professor David Rogosa called 
it a “scam” and an example of the “if it could be, it is” 
approach to measuring school performance.22 W. James 
Popham, emeritus professor in the UCLA Graduate 
School of Education and Information Studies, called them 
a “statistical sleight of hand,” saying:
“Despite outraged assertions from a number of 
qualified statisticians that applying confidence 
intervals in AYP calculations is flat-out wrong, 
federal officials have nonetheless allowed 
states to use confidence intervals—most likely 
to limit the number of schools that would 
otherwise take an AYP nosedive.”23
Still, the U.S. Department of Education approved the 
amendment, with some enthusiasm. In fact, it prodded 
Alabama to go even further. In a May 20, 2004, letter to 
Alabama, Assistant Secretary of Education Ray Simon said:
“States have great flexibility in the design of 
their systems and implementation of particular 
NCLB provisions. If, as you implement your 
accountability plan, you find additional 
elements of your plan that you believe should 
be refined or amended for next school year 
to best serve the needs of your students and 
schools, I encourage you to explore all the 
areas of flexibility availability to your State.” 
Alabama didn’t need the encouragement. There was 
much more “flexibility”—read, “leniency”—to come.
School Year 2004–05 
Learning From Other States
Birmingham City Schools didn’t make AYP in the 2003–04 
school year. In large part, this was because it missed 
badly on the one measure the state hadn’t (yet) watered 
down: participation rates. To ensure accurate results—and 
to prevent schools from keeping low-achieving students 
home on testing day—NCLB requires 95 percent of 
students, both schoolwide and in each subgroup, to 
take each test. While Birmingham’s white students met 
this standard in 2003, its black and Hispanic students 
did not. Because it was the first year of the new test, 
moreover, the uniform averaging provision had yet to kick 
in. And because the district is relatively large, enrolling 
over 30,000 students, the minimum subgroup size and 
confidence intervals weren’t enough at the time to offset 
some truly dismal results.24 Students with disabilities fared 
particularly badly—only 6 percent of eighth-graders in 
special education met the already-lenient “proficiency” 
standard. Other measures pointed to stagnation and 
decline. Enrollment was down another 2,000 students, 
and the district once again got a “D-minus” for a 17.4 
average ACT score.
But missing AYP had little effect on Birmingham as it 
began the 2004–05 school year. The old accountability 
system had been thrown out, and the consequences of 
missing AYP under the new one wouldn’t be felt unless 
the district fell short for multiple consecutive years. The 
Alabama Department of Education was taking steps to 
make sure that would never happen, by devising a new 
set of revisions to its accountability plan. Statewide, only 
23 percent of schools and no districts had made AYP. 
Test participation rates were most often the culprit, an 
easy enough problem to fix. But the department took no 
chances, looking to other states for innovative ways to 
lower the NCLB bar. It found one in neighboring Tennessee.
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In the previous year, states had proposed scores of 
accountability plan amendments to the U.S. Department 
of Education, every one designed to make it look like 
more schools and districts were high-performing. 
The department rejected some of the most egregious 
ideas.25 But others, like the “Tennessee model,” made it 
through. This proposal applied specifically to districts. 
Most states—Alabama included—averaged school- and 
district-level test results across multiple grades. This 
made sense; otherwise, districts could be on the hook 
for over 100 separate scores.26 But that still meant that 
districts would miss AYP if scores fell short in either 
reading and math for any of the student subgroups—just 
what NCLB’s authors intended. Tennessee proposed a 
much easier standard: Districts would only be identified 
as “in need of improvement” if they missed the state 
performance target in all three grade spans—elementary, 
middle, and high school—in the same subject, for two 
consecutive years. A district could fail two-thirds of its 
students every year and never be held accountable, as 
long as it wasn’t exactly the same two-thirds. Remarkably, 
the U.S. Department of Education approved the proposal.
That endorsement opened the floodgates. The following 
year, 18 states, including Alabama, asked to adopt the 
Tennessee model, and 10 more filed similar requests 
the year after that. They all cited the venerable legal 
principle of precedent: “If Tennessee, why not us?” The 
U.S. Department of Education had no response, and 
so the Tennessee model became the norm. Supreme 
Court Justice Louis Brandeis’ description of states as the 
“laboratories of democracy” had once again been proven 
true. In this case, the laboratories were concocting ever-
more-innovative ways to thwart the intent of NCLB. 
The U.S. Department of Education, meanwhile, was 
sending more signals of encouragement. President 
Bush’s re-election in 2004 brought a new Secretary of 
Education, Margaret Spellings. Her predecessor, Rod 
Paige, had ended his tenure in a sour relationship with 
the education establishment. Spellings tried to strike a 
more collaborative tone, announcing in April 2005 that the 
department would adopt “a new approach” under which 
“states will have additional alternatives and flexibility” if 
they showed evidence of academic improvement and 
closing the achievement gap. 
Taking Spellings at her word, Alabama took steps to 
address its participation rate problem. Glitches aren’t 
uncommon in the first year of a new testing regime, 
and many Alabama schools and districts increased 
their participation rates significantly from school year 
2003–04 to 2004–05. But the state also lowered the bar 
by applying the uniform-averaging-with-a-twist procedure 
that previously had been approved for test scores, giving 
schools and districts credit for the greater of the current 
year’s participation rate or the three-year average. 
Higher participation rates helped a number of schools, 
and the newer, laxer accountability standards did the rest. 
Statewide performance on reading and math tests inched 
up in elementary and middle schools from 2003–04, while 
staying flat in high school. The AYP results, by contrast, 
were dramatic. The percent of schools making the grade 
more than doubled, from 23 percent to 53 percent. The 
payoff of applying the Tennessee model to districts 
was even greater—68 percent met all the standards, 
compared to zero percent the year before. State 
Superintendent of Education Joe Morton announced the 
results, saying: 
“The gains made by schools this year are very 
encouraging. Educators statewide worked 
extremely hard to improve the status of their 
schools and to achieve greater accountability 
than has ever been reported in the history of 
this state’s public education system.” 27
In newspaper stories around the state, Morton’s optimistic 
words were echoed by local educators eager to take 
credit for moving their schools off the NCLB list. Words 
like “confidence interval,” “uniform averaging,” and 
“Tennessee model” were nowhere to be found.
School Year 2005–06
Rise of the ‘Performance Index’
Birmingham City Schools missed AYP again in 2004–05, 
but with increased participation rates it came much closer 
than it did the year before. Black, Hispanic, low-income, 
and limited English proficient students all fell short of the 
state performance target in fourth-grade reading, despite 
the fact that—due to the adjustable rate improvement 
trajectory—the target hadn’t gone up from the year before. 
But the 99-percent confidence interval did the trick, 
lowering the bar far enough for each group to get over. 
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Only special education scores were so bleak (26 percent 
passing, compared to 83 percent for all students 
statewide) that even the confidence interval couldn’t save 
them.
The Alabama Department of Education was hard at work 
on a “solution” to this problem, however, and in this it 
was not alone. The year 2006 marked four years since 
NCLB’s enactment, more than enough time for states 
to create and refine their initial accountability plans. Yet 
the number of states seeking to change those plans 
by requesting amendments was growing, more than 
doubling from the year before.28 It was clear at this point 
that the vast majority of states would never be content 
to stick with a single plan. Instead, they would continue 
the annual cycle of amendments—always with the aim of 
lowering standards—as long as they were allowed. Every 
year a few states would get a new standards-lowering 
gambit past the U.S. Department of Education, and every 
following year the remaining states would apply en masse 
for the same consideration. 
The political pressure on the U.S. Department of 
Education to give in to these demands was substantial 
and growing. Interest groups like the National Education 
Association, the nation’s largest teachers union, routinely 
denounced the law, as did conservatives who viewed 
it as an unwarranted expansion of federal power. The 
National Conference of State Legislatures issued a report 
questioning the constitutionality of NCLB and calling for 
Secretary Spellings to “waive requirements of the law.”29 
And when the department turned down Connecticut’s 
request to suspend annual testing in grades 3-8—a clear 
violation of the statute—the state responded by filing a 
lawsuit in federal court. 
The accountability dodge du jour in 2006 was the 
“performance index.” Like minimum subgroup sizes, it 
was based on a germ of a reasonable idea. NCLB critics 
often noted that focusing on a single performance level—
“proficiency”—could cause schools to ignore students 
who were either far above or far below the proficiency 
line. Performance indices blended the percent of students 
at multiple achievement levels, like the lower “basic” and 
the higher “advanced,” into a single composite score. 
Alabama defined the levels in terms of simple roman 
numerals: Levels I, II, III, and IV, with II being equivalent 
to “basic,” III meaning “proficient,” and IV meaning 
“advanced.”  The U.S. Department of Education didn’t 
allow states to offset underperformance at the lower levels 
by giving schools extra credit for the percent of students 
reaching the “advanced” level. So Alabama proposed 
giving schools half credit for every student who missed III 
but achieved II. The U.S. Department of Education agreed.
There was just one problem: Nearly every student in 
Alabama was already at Level II.  Recall that the Level 
III proficiency standard itself was unusually easy; 
approximately 75 percent to 85 percent of Alabama 
students had already reached that standard by 2005, 
depending on the grade and test. In fourth-grade reading, 
99.7 percent of students were at Level II or above  Thus, 
the practical effect of the performance index was simply 
to take half of all the non-proficient students in Alabama 
and count them as proficient, for no other reason than 
helping their schools make AYP. 
Alabama also took steps to address the persistently low-
performing special education population. Many states 
had argued that it was unreasonable to expect students 
with the severest disabilities to meet common standards. 
This problem is often exaggerated—disability categories 
like autism, for example, are growing but still make up 
less than 4 percent of all special education students, who 
in turn constitute less than 15 percent of all students.30 
From the beginning of NCLB, states were allowed to 
assess 1 percent of all students—not just students with 
disabilities, but the whole population—using non-standard 
assessments. The U.S. Department of Education allowed 
Alabama to assume that an additional 2 percent of all 
students had disabilities so severe that they should be 
counted as proficient, even if they were not. 
Alabama also asked to increase its minimum subgroup 
size from 40 to the greater of 40 or 10 percent of the 
school population. Statistically speaking, this made no 
sense, since the accuracy of test results for a given group 
of students doesn’t change depending on how many other 
students in the school there happen to be. But Alabama 
had reason for optimism—the U.S. Department had 
approved a similar request from several other states the 
previous year.31 Precedent had been a winning argument 
for the Tennessee model, and there was no reason to think 
the same principle wouldn’t apply. 
This time, however, Alabama was the victim of bad 
timing. Just as the U.S. Department of Education was 
considering Alabama’s latest application to water down 
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AYP standards, the Associated Press published a series 
of high-profile articles about minimum subgroup sizes, 
noting that nearly two million, mostly minority, students 
nationwide belonged to excluded subgroups. Mindful of 
the fact that NCLB was specifically written to help those 
students, a group of Congressmen led by Rep. George 
Miller (D-Calif.), then the ranking member and now the 
chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, 
wrote a letter to Secretary Spellings saying:
“It appears from these press reports that 
many states have been gaming the system, 
appealing to the U.S. Department of Education 
for loopholes that allow the exclusion of 
millions of minority children’s scores from their 
accountability subgroups. States must not be 
allowed to continue to do this any longer.”32
The U.S. Department of Education subsequently denied 
Alabama’s request to increase minimum subgroup sizes. 
But the performance index gambit, combined with all the 
loopholes and relaxations that had come before, turned 
out to be more than enough to accomplish the goal of 
boosting the number of schools and districts making AYP. 
On August 7, 2006, the Alabama Department of Education 
released the latest school results along with a press 
release with the following title: “More Than 87 Percent 
of Alabama Schools Make AYP: More Schools Meet 100 
Percent of the AYP Goals Despite This Year’s Increased 
Annual Measurable Objectives.”
Commenting on the new school ratings, Alabama 
Governor Bob Riley said: “Alabama schools are making 
tremendous strides. We’re seeing unprecedented 
improvements in the quality of education in our state.” 
Added State Superintendent of Education Joseph B. 
Morton: “What’s remarkable is that depending on the 
different groups of student populations across the state, 
schools have anywhere from five to 39 goals. Under No 
Child Left Behind law, if a school does not meet just one 
of those goals it doesn’t make AYP. That’s an incredibly 
high standard by anyone’s measures… .” Explaining the 
source of this fantastic improvement—in just two years, 
the percent of schools making AYP went from 23 percent 
to 88 percent, and the percent of districts went from 
a startling zero percent to 100 percent—Morton said: 
“Educators are teaching to higher standards, students 
are studying, and administrators are working to improve 
the status of their schools and increase the quality of the 
education being received.”
This was, to say the least, a deeply misleading account 
of why so many schools and districts in Alabama were 
suddenly leaping over the NCLB bar. Actual improvements 
in student test scores were not “unprecedented”—the 
percent of students scoring at proficient or above 
increased modestly in most grades, at roughly the same 
rate as the year before. And the “incredibly high” NCLB 
standard of meeting up to 39 goals was a fantasy; the 
Alabama Department of Education had spent the past four 
years assiduously working to shield schools from being 
held accountable in exactly that way. 
Birmingham’s results make this clear. The district continued 
to struggle in 2006. Enrollment declined by another 1,400 
students, and the average ACT score dropped once 
again. While local and state officials argued over whether 
school security guards should be armed with stun guns, 
the “black flight” phenomenon of minority families with 
children leaving for better suburban schools continued.33 
Said the mother of one family, which continued to pay the 
mortgage on its Birmingham house even as it lived in a 
rented suburban apartment: “I always knew that even if 
we had to work two or three jobs, our child was not going 
to Birmingham high schools.” The father of another family 
said: “We loved where we lived—the area, the community.” 
But when it came to his sons’ education, “It was either 
sacrifice them or get out.”34
The parents’ worries were reflected in district test scores. 
Table 3 shows the percent of Birmingham students in 
each grade and subgroup proficient in reading and math 
in 2006, compared to the state performance target. Dark-
blue shaded cells represent scores that exceeded the 
state performance target, while light-blue shaded cells 
represent scores that fell short. 
Birmingham did more than miss “just one goal” in 2006—it 
missed most of them. If the state hadn’t chosen the 
adjustable rate improvement trajectory, which kept state 
performance targets artificially low in the initial years of 
NCLB, it would have missed more still. While Birmingham 
had made significant progress in some grades and subjects 
over the previous two years, the district was still failing badly 
with many students, particularly those in special education, 
who fell short in every subject and grade by a wide margin. 
But that wasn’t the message parents and the local 
community received the day after the scores and school 
ratings were released. Despite the low test scores, the 
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Table 3. Birmingham City schools test scores 200
Grade 3
Reading 
Score
Reading 
Target
Math 
Score
Math 
Target Grade 4
Reading 
Score
Reading 
Target
Math 
Score
Math 
Target
All Students 74.45 73 68.32 63 All Students 71.88 73 68.73 67
Special Education 31.86 73 30.65 63 Special Education 25.26 73 24.19 67
Black 74.54 73 68.31 63 Black 72.05 73 68.45 67
Hispanic 62.5 73 64 63 Hispanic 52.17 73 64.58 67
White 84.38 73 71.88 63 White 84.21 73 83.78 67
Low-Income 72.05 73 65.44 63 Low-Income 69.42 73 66.52 67
Limited English 
Proficient 65.39 73 68.42 63
Limited English 
Proficient 50 73 65.3 67
  
Grade 5
Reading 
Score
Reading 
Target
Math 
Score
Math 
Target Grade 6
Reading 
Score
Reading 
Target
Math 
Score
Math 
Target
All Students 70.2 73 69.26 59 All Students 67.92 78 57.85 48
Special Education 25.64 73 26.69 59 Special Education 23.4 78 19.16 48
Black 70.21 73 69.35 59 Black 67.98 78 57.44 48
Hispanic 60.87 73 63.46 59 Hispanic 62.51 78 75.75 48
White 75 73 63.88 59 White 73.68 78 72.22 48
Low-Income 67.75 73 67.05 59 Low-Income 65.75 78 56.22 48
Limited English 
Proficient 61.22 73 65.46 59
Limited English 
Proficient 58.62 78 73.33 48
  
Grade 7
Reading 
Score
Reading 
Target
Math 
Score
Math 
Target Grade 8
Reading 
Score
Reading 
Target
Math 
Score
Math 
Target
All Students 63.68 63 41.93 40 All Students 60 51 56.6 48
Special Education 21.43 63 8.89 40 Special Education 20.17 51 24.57 48
Black 64.05 63 41.71 40 Black 59.73 51 56.31 48
Hispanic 36.67 63 36.36 40 Hispanic 60.87 51 65.52 48
White 62.07 63 62.07 40 White 82.14 51 67.86 48
Low-Income 61.95 63 36.56 40 Low-Income 56.18 51 53.52 48
Limited English 
Proficient 30.76 63 31.8 40
Limited English 
Proficient 44.44 51 60.87 48
  
Grade 11
Reading 
Score
Reading 
Target
Math 
Score 
Math 
Target  
All Students 79.12 84 77.89 73  
Special Education 35.72 84 46.2 73  
Black 79.38 84 77.94 73  
Hispanic 54.55 84 72.73 73  
White 72.72 84 72.73 73  
Low-Income 75.6 84 74.85 73  
Limited English 
Proficient n/a  n/a             
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accumulation of accountability loopholes had finally done 
the job—Birmingham made AYP. Echoing the celebratory 
tone of the governor and state superintendent, local 
school board president Odessa Ashley was quoted 
the next day in the Birmingham News saying: “I am 
overwhelmed with the progress we have made in the 
Birmingham public schools system. And it is because of 
the instructional leaders we have.”35
Parents were also missing the benefits that come with 
schools being identified as needing improvement under 
NCLB. School that miss AYP for two years in a row are 
required to give parents the option of transferring their 
children to another, higher-performing school within the 
district. If schools fall short three years in a row, they have 
to offer free after-school tutoring. But because Alabama 
started NCLB a year late and identified few schools as 
missing AYP in 2006, not many parents in Birmingham or 
elsewhere received the choice and tutoring benefits. And 
no Birmingham schools had reached the more serious, final 
stages of NCLB accountability, the “restructuring” that can 
potentially result in schools being closed down. NCLB had 
promised tough action on behalf of children in persistently 
failing schools. In Alabama—four years and counting since 
the law’s enactment—that promise had yet to be delivered. 
School Year 2006–07
Good for Schools, Bad for  
Parents, Children
With the work of ensuring that the vast majority of schools 
and districts made AYP regardless of underperformance 
basically finished, the Alabama Department of Education 
made no major changes to the state accountability plan 
in 2007. In 2006, the U.S. Department of Education had 
said that Alabama and other states would be allowed to 
write off 2 percent of all students as too severely disabled 
to test (and therefore “proficient”) “for this year only.” In 
2007, the department approved an identical request “for 
this year only” again. 
With performance targets starting to rise and no new 
gimmicks on the books, it wasn’t surprising that the 
number of schools making AYP dipped to 82 percent. 
They weren’t all the same schools, however, which 
meant that many schools were no longer “in need of 
improvement” due to missing AYP for two years in a row. 
That was more than enough for Alabama’s political leaders 
to present the results as another great leap forward. Said 
Governor Riley in August 2007:
“Alabama’s schools have made tremendous 
progress during the past few years. Just three 
years ago, only 23 percent of schools met all 
their yearly progress goals. This year, we’ve 
raised the bar and saw a sharp decrease in 
the number of schools designated as needing 
‘school improvement.’”
That meant that even fewer parents and students 
received school choice benefits, a fact that the Alabama 
Department of Education deemed important enough to 
merit a congratulatory press release, which began:
“Montgomery, Ala. —More positive news for 
Alabama schools following the release of the 
2007 Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) report. 
The data indicates a 70 percent decrease from 
last year in the number of Title I schools … 
identified for School Improvement. That means 
fewer schools in Alabama must offer School 
Choice for the upcoming school year. School 
Choice provides parents alternatives on where 
their children can attend school.” 
This single paragraph encapsulates the essential problem 
with state implementation of NCLB. Accountability 
systems can make life uncomfortable for underperforming 
public schools. That’s the point: to throw the stark light of 
public scrutiny on schools that consistently fail to educate 
students well and to create strong incentives—even 
requirements—for education leaders to take actions to 
improve. Those actions can be painful but necessary, 
because the best interests of adults in the education 
system aren’t always the same as the best interests of 
students. Conversely, “more positive news for Alabama 
schools” can be more negative news for Alabama parents 
and children. That the Alabama Department of Education 
not only admitted this but announced it in a press release 
shows exactly whose side it is on. 
Alabama is not alone among the states in this respect, or 
even the worst offender. Time after time over the last five 
years, state departments of education acted to protect 
their schools and districts from the consequences of 
NCLB accountability, even though those actions badly 
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undermined the intent of the law, to the detriment of 
the state’s students. Every one of the accountability-
avoidance gambits used in Alabama has been adopted 
in many other states. As a result, states like Wisconsin 
and Oklahoma identified an even smaller percentage of 
schools as missing AYP.  
Some states went even further. The U.S. Department 
of Education recently cited the Missouri Department of 
Education for systematically violating the law and refusing 
to identify schools as “in need of improvement.” Unlike 
Alabama, Missouri didn’t bother to game the system—it 
broke the system, unapologetically. Claiming both 
ignorance and recalcitrance, the Missouri Department 
of Education’s director of federal programs attributed 
the lawbreaking to “a combination of not agreeing with 
aspects of the law and not being clear about what was 
expected of us in some cases.”36  
To be sure, state departments of education aren’t filled 
with bad people who don’t care about education and 
actively want to ruin the lives of schoolchildren. But they 
are political organizations, vulnerable to pressure from 
special interest groups like those that represent local 
school boards, superintendents, and other members 
of the education establishment. They often see their 
principal clients as fellow educators, working hard to meet 
unreasonable demands. State departments were designed 
and built as bureaucracies, organizations whose essential 
function is compliance with rules. If you see NCLB as 
just another set of onerous federal rules to comply with 
in order to receive federal funds, then gaming the system 
makes a kind of sense. It’s certainly cheaper and easier 
than actually turning around low-performing schools. 
There are exceptions, of course. Some states have done 
better than others in complying with the letter and spirit 
of NCLB. It’s instructive to note that Massachusetts—
46th on the Pangloss Index—posted significant gains 
on the NAEP from 2003 to 2007, despite the fact that it 
was already the highest-performing state in the nation 
when the law was enacted. While Alabama has boosted 
fourth-grade NAEP scores, its eighth-graders—the only 
students who were enrolled in NCLB-tested grades over 
the entire five-year span of the law—made almost no 
progress at all.37
School Year 2007–08 and Beyond
Birmingham City Schools began the 2007–08 school year 
diminished in many ways. Over the last five years, nearly 
one-quarter of the student population has bled away. An 
emergency plan earlier in 2007 to cut $15 million from the 
budget staved off financial takeover by the state, but the 
ongoing exodus of families and children makes future cuts 
all but inevitable. The students who remain are badly in 
need of outside help, of someone willing to step forward 
with the time, resources, and attention needed to turn the 
failing district around. 
So far, the Alabama Department of Education has not 
risen to the challenge. Instead of working to solve the 
problem, it seems to have spent most of the last five years 
devising ever-more-creative ways to deny that it exists. 
Instead of holding Birmingham’s leaders accountable, 
it has given them a series of free passes. The result, 
inevitably, is a district that is not nearly as effective as its 
children need it to be. 
Hopefully, education leaders in Alabama will realize 
that they can best serve the state’s citizens by being 
more honest about the state’s educational failures and 
challenging schools and districts to improve. In the 
meantime, Congress should make sure that such actions 
are far less optional than they are today. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Congress is currently working to revise NCLB. And if 
there’s one thing it can count on, it’s that state departments 
of education will not change their essential nature 
anytime soon. There are also limits—both political and 
institutional—to which the U.S. Department of Education 
can be expected to resist constant state pressure to water 
down accountability. Congress would thus do well to write 
the next version of NCLB with the lessons of how states 
reacted to the current version firmly in mind.
Five Recommendations for Congress
To ensure that states better comply with the spirit of 
public school accountability, and to give students in 
cities like Birmingham a fighting chance at a high-quality 
education, Congress should consider the following 
recommendations when it writes the next version of No 
Child Left Behind:
1) Close the Loopholes. While the U.S. Department of 
Education rightly rejected some state proposals to 
water down NCLB standards, it let others through. 
These proposals have now become institutionalized to 
the point where it will be difficult for the department to 
root them out of state accountability plans. Therefore, 
Congress should explicitly prohibit the following:
Minimum subgroup sizes larger than 25: It’s 
reasonable to not hold schools accountable for 
very small groups of students, because those 
results can be statistically unreliable. But that 
interest must be balanced with the need to focus 
resources and attention on minority students 
and others who—by definition—make up only 
a fraction of the school population. Minimum 
subgroups sizes of 25 or less strike a fair middle 
ground.
Confidence intervals of any kind: Confidence 
intervals would make sense if states only tested 
a sample of students, but they’re statistically 
inappropriate when testing entire populations. 
Minimum subgroup sizes are sufficient to ensure 
reliable results; adding confidence intervals on 
top of them is redundant and results in schools 
“meeting” performance targets even when falling 
far short of the actual goal.
•
•
The “Tennessee model”: The practice—now 
used by most states—of identifying districts 
as “in need of improvement” only when they 
miss AYP in the same subject in all three grade 
spans—elementary, middle, and high school—for 
two consecutive years has eviscerated district-
level accountability under NCLB. It allows districts 
to fail two-thirds of their students every year 
and never be identified, as long as they’re not 
exactly the same students. This runs directly 
counter to NCLB’s stated goal of holding districts 
accountable for all students in both reading and 
math. It is particularly problematic given that 
successful school improvement strategies nearly 
always require strong leadership and coordination 
at the district level.
Fake “Performance Indices”: It makes sense to 
give schools incentives to focus on more than 
a single performance level, so the highest- and 
lowest-performing students aren’t ignored. 
Performance indices theoretically accomplish that 
goal by giving schools credit for the percent of 
students who reach multiple standards, including 
the lower “basic” level of achievement. But 
performance indices only work when “basic” is 
a legitimate standard, not (as in Alabama) a level 
that every student with a pulse has already met. 
States should only be allowed to give schools 
credit for the percent of students reaching “basic” 
or its equivalent on the state test if that level (A) 
is at least equivalent to the NAEP “basic” level 
in terms of the percent of students meeting the 
standard, or (B) was not reached by at least 15 
percent of students in 2007.
Adjustable Rate Improvement Trajectories: By the 
time Congress finishes the new version of NCLB, 
most states that chose back-loaded improvement 
trajectories will be close to the year when the 
performance bill begins to come due. In that 
sense, most of the damage from this strategy 
has already been done. If, however, Congress 
allows states to extend the 2014 deadline for 100 
percent proficiency in exchange for increasing the 
rigor of their standards, it should require states 
to create a straight-line improvement trajectory 
comprised of equal, annual increments. 38 (States 
that want to front-load improvement and reach 
100 percent proficiency a few years early should, 
of course, be allowed to do so.) 
•
•
•
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2) Be Specific. 2007 brought a host of proposals from 
Congressional leaders, bipartisan commissions, 
and others to change NCLB’s core accountability 
system. While the proposals vary, many—like the 
idea of incorporating “multiple measures” other than 
standardized test scores in reading and math into 
state accountability systems—would give states more 
flexibility to implement NCLB than they have today. 
 
Congress should be extremely cautious in this regard. 
NCLB is, in many ways, a narrowly written statute 
(in fact, this is one of the chief sources of criticism 
against it). Yet states have managed to find many 
opportunities to undermine the law within the small 
spaces provided by subgroup sizes, confidence 
intervals, etc. Increasing state flexibility will provide 
a whole new set of opportunities to sabotage 
accountability, and many states will inevitably 
seize the chance. To prevent this from happening, 
Congress should be as specific as possible when 
altering NCLB’s core accountability system, 
minimizing states’ ability to deviate from the core 
tenets of the law. 
 
To take one example, some have proposed that any 
additional or “multiple” AYP measures beyond reading 
and math tests be confined to only a limited number 
of measures that address significant academic 
subjects and are available to all students in a given 
state. Others have called for the multiple measures 
concept to be applied far more loosely and broadly, 
giving states a great deal of flexibility to measure 
whatever they want, however they please. Given the 
track record of states in using their current, more 
limited flexibility under NCLB, the latter course would 
almost surely lead to the effective dismantlement of 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act as a 
catalyst for school improvement. 
3) Improve Peer Review. When states submitted their 
first NCLB accountability plans in 2002, the plans 
were reviewed by “peer review” teams that traveled 
to each state for a day to discuss the plans with 
state department staff. Amendments to state plans, 
however, have simply been reviewed internally by the 
U.S. Department of Education. This process clearly 
has been inadequate, and the U.S. Department of 
Education itself established a superior model when it 
invited state applications to experiment with “growth 
model” accountability measures. NCLB has been 
frequently—and justifiably—criticized for its lack of 
attention to the year-to-year progress of individual 
students. If a student starts the school year four grade 
levels behind, and the school makes an heroic effort 
to help the student catch up three years, the result 
is not different than if it had ignored that student 
completely: the student is still “not proficient.” This 
should change. But the danger of using growth 
measures is that states could give schools credit for 
any growth, even if it’s not enough to help students 
eventually catch up. During the IASA era, when 
states had much more discretion to design their 
accountability systems, a number did exactly that. 
 
To ensure that the growth model experiments 
wouldn’t undermine NCLB, the U.S. Department of 
Education convened a diverse mix of outside experts, 
including researchers, advocates, and education 
leaders, to review and approve state proposals. Some 
of the reviewers had been openly skeptical of the 
growth model concept. The process worked well, 
with the review panel ultimately approving a number 
of state proposals, but only those that limited extra 
accountability credit to students whose growth put 
them on a trajectory to become proficient within a 
defined period of time. Congress should expand this 
process to include all state accountability plans, and 
subsequent revisions to those plans, under the next 
version of NCLB. This will insulate the process from 
political pressure and the inevitable bureaucratic 
instinct to placate and compromise. 
4) Stick to the Plan. When Congress gave states 
wide latitude to amend their accountability plans, it 
probably didn’t envision the never-ending barrage 
of standards-lowering proposals that subsequently 
occurred. It’s become clear that too many states see 
the amendment process not as a chance to fine-tune 
plans and correct mistakes, but a way to annually 
lower the achievement bar even as they tell the public 
that standards are being raised. 
 
Therefore, Congress should require states to submit 
a two-year accountability plan, subject to the peer 
review process described above, after which states 
will have one opportunity (barring emergency or 
revision of technical errors) to revise the plan for 
another two years. This will shut down the thriving 
marketplace for innovative accountability dodges that 
is currently eroding the foundation of NCLB.
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5) Promote Shared Standards. The profusion of 
state schemes to evade NCLB accountability is 
due in large part to the fact that every state is 
allowed and encouraged to devise its own unique 
system of standards, tests, and accountability. 
There are good reasons for some state standards 
to differ—perspectives on mid-19th century history 
differ between Alabama and Massachusetts, for 
good reason. But in most cases, and especially 
in the core subjects of reading and math, states 
and students are better off working together to 
develop shared standards. Congress should provide 
stronger incentives, financial and otherwise, for 
states to voluntarily collaborate on a range of shared 
standards—not just for academic subject matter and 
testing, but also for the accountability systems that 
undergird NCLB.
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Data Sources and Methodology
This report is based on data submitted by state 
departments of education to the U.S. Department of 
Education through reports called Consolidated State 
Performance Reports (CSPRs). The latest CSPRs were 
submitted in 2007 and were provided to Education Sector 
by the U.S. Department of Education.  
The “Pangloss Index” found in Table 1 of this report is 
calculated by aggregating state rankings on 11 measures 
derived from the CSPRs. Those measures are:
The number of persistently dangerous schools as 
a percentage of all schools, 2005–2006.
Statewide high school graduation rates,  
2004–2005.
Statewide high school dropout rates, 2004–2005.
Percent of core academic classes taught by highly 
qualified teachers, 2005–2006.
Percent of qualified Title I paraprofessionals, 
2005–2006.
Percent of public schools that made adequate 
yearly progress, 2005–2006.
Percent of public school districts that made 
adequate yearly progress, 2005–2006.
Average percent of students proficient or 
advanced in fourth-grade math and reading 2005–
2006.  (Note: This amount, as well as the average 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
proficiency rates in eighth grade and high school, 
is calculated by averaging separately reported 
reading and math proficiency rates. If a state 
reported a proficiency rate in one subject but not 
the other, the proficiency rate for the reported 
subject was used.)
Average percent of students proficient or 
advanced in eighth-grade math and reading, 
2005–2006.
Average percent of students proficient or 
advanced in high school math and reading, 
2005–2006.
Percent of teachers receiving high-quality 
professional development, 2003–2004.  (Note: 
States were not required to report this measure 
in 2007. To facilitate comparisons with the 2006 
Pangloss Index, the same data were used for the 
2007 that were used in 2006, which were derived 
from CSPRs submitted in 2005). 
For each measure, states were ranked so that the states 
reporting the most positive results were ranked highest. 
For example, while states were ranked highest if they 
reported the highest high school graduation rates and 
highest percent of schools making adequate yearly 
progress, they were also ranked highest if they reported 
the lowest number of persistently dangerous schools and 
the lowest high school dropout rates. 
Some states did not submit data for some measures. In 
those cases, states were, for ranking purposes, assigned 
the median value of those states that did submit data. 
•
•
•
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